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Abstract
We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are del-
egated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents
react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the
importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm interactions of principals and agents
in competition. We show that price delegation can increase or decrease the firms’
surplus depending on the heterogeneity of the market and the number of agents
employed by the firms.
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1 Introduction
Whereas principal-agent theory typically restricts itself to the analysis of intrafirm
interaction by neglecting interfirm competition, most models in the theory of Indus-
trial Organization (IO) focus purely on interfirm competition by assuming a unitary
decision maker for each of the competing firms. While studying only one of these two
basic interaction types certainly answers many questions, in some cases it may sug-
gest questionable implications for real-world behavior facing typically both types of
interaction. For instance, a standard principal-agent framework (see, e.g., Grossman,
Hart 1983) neglects interfirm competition and, hence, the influence of market con-
ditions on intrafirm compensation schemes. Similarly, assuming a unitary decision
maker in IO models of interfirm competition ignores the principal-agent relationships
and thus the decisive reason why firms may abstain from profit maximization.
Of course, principals may be the only ones determining both, intrafirm and inter-
firm interactions. If principals, for instance, confront their agents with piece rates, all
what agents have to do is match their efforts with the given piece rates, i.e., agents
neither interact strategically with other agents of the same nor with those working
in other firms. Thus if only principals are involved in intrafirm and interfirm inter-
action, the analysis is rather simple and straightforward. Here we focus, however, on
situations where not only principals are “running the mill”: in our model principals
only determine the incentives for their agents who then choose their firm’s sales
policy. Hence, in this scenario, principals as well as agents are engaged in interfirm
competition.
Our analysis is related to the strategic delegation analysis of Vickers (1985), Fersht-
man (1985), Fershtman, Judd (1987, 2006), Sklivas (1987), Caillaud, Jullien, Picard
(1995) and Schmidt (1997) who study intrafirm incentives for managers facing a
market with interfirm quantity or price competition. In these delegation games, the
profit-maximizing principals (the owners) implement an incentive scheme for their
agents (the managers) based on a weighted difference of revenue and cost. Fumas
(1992) and Miller, Pazgal (2001) consider an incentive scheme based on a weighted
sum of a firm’s own profit and and its rival’s profit. Kräkel (2005) investigates
tournament-like interfirm competition based on a principal-(one) agent framework.
These models have in common that they restrict analysis to the delegation to man-
ager agents who decide on prices or quantities but are not involved in production,
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i.e. they face no cost of producing. In contrast we are interested in the decisions
of worker agents who will anticipate the consequences of their price or quantity
decisions on their effort.
Güth, Pull, and Stadler (2011) have also studied intrafirm and interfirm interaction
between principals and agents in an integrated model. They analyzed how revenue
sharing affects the behavior and payoffs on a homogeneous oligopoly market with
quantity competition.1 On most markets firms, however, compete in prices. There-
fore, we explore the case where principals implement a revenue sharing scheme and
agents compete via prices. The price decisions of all competing firms in the market
determine the quantities to be produced by all firms and, hence, the effort costs of
their agents.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes a benchmark
case with price competition between two monolithic firms. Section 3 introduces dele-
gation and price competition by workers allowing an integrative analysis of strategic
intra- and interfirm interaction based on the realistic assumptions of price competi-
tion. Section 4 concludes.
2 The benchmark: price competition between two
monolithic firms
We consider two competing firms i = 1, 2 in a heterogeneous market with firm




ei,k, i = 1, 2; k = 1, ..., n,
where ei,k denotes the effort level of agent k employed in firm i. Sales are assumed to
serve demand for differentiated products. To keep the model analytically tractable,
we rely on linear demand functions of the standardized form
qi(pi, pj) = 1 − pi + θ(pj − pi) ; i = 1, 2, i 6= j ,
1Quantity competition can be justified by the necessity of firms to set up capacities before
engaging in price competition (see, e.g. Kreps, Scheinkman 1983).
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for the two substitute goods with restrictions qi > 0, i = 1, 2, where 1/θ ∈ (0,∞)
indicates the degree of market heterogeneity. In the limit case θ = 0 there are two
coexisting monopoly markets without interfirm competition. In the other extreme
case where θ → ∞ the market becomes homogeneous since, in the limit, any price
difference will not leave (positive) demand for the more expensive seller. Costs of
the agents’ sales efforts are private and commonly known. All agents share the same




To provide a benchmark solution without intrafirm interaction let us first assume
that both firms maximize their surplus for example by assuming a unitary decision
maker for each firm who dictates effort levels and monetarily compensates his n
agents for their effort costs. Due to the strictly convex cost function, each firm will
impose the same effort level ei,k = ei for all workers k = 1, ..., n. Thus the surplus
for each firm can be expressed by
Si(pi, pj) = pi(1 − (1 + θ)pi + θpj) − (1 − (1 + θ)pi + θpj)
2/(2n); i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
From the first-order conditions the equilibrium prices are derived as
p∗ =
1 + θ + n
1 + θ + (2 + θ)n
,
leading to each firm’s output
q∗ =
(1 + θ)n
1 + θ + (2 + θ)n
and surplus
S∗ =
(1 + θ)n(1 + θ + 2n)
2(1 + θ + (2 + θ)n)2
.
Some numerical results are summarized in Table 1 for a fixed number of n = 2 agents
per firm and in Table 2 for a fixed intermediate degree of heterogeneity, θ = 1. As
it is a well-known result in oligopoly theory, a decreasing degree of heterogeneity
(an increasing θ) lowers equilibrium prices and the firms’ surplus even if agents’
individual efforts and sales increase (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Numerical solution of the price-competition game with monolithic firms,
n = 2.
θ 0 1 ... θ → ∞
p∗ 0.600 0.500 ... 0.333
q∗ 0.400 0.500 ... 0.666
e∗ 0.200 0.250 ... 0.333
S∗ 0.200 0.188 ... 0.111
For a given degree of heterogeneity (θ = 1) all outcome variables react monotonically
to an increase of the same number n of employees in both firms. Prices decline and
agents’ individual efforts converge to 0 whereas sales and surplus levels increase
monotonically (see Table 2).
Table 2: Numerical solution of the price-competition game with monolithic firms,
θ = 1.
n 1 2 3 ... 100 ... n → ∞
p∗ 0.600 0.500 0.455 ... 0.338 ... 0.333
q∗ 0.400 0.500 0.555 ... 0.662 ... 0.667
e∗ 0.400 0.250 0.185 ... 0.007 ... 0.000
S∗ 0.160 0.188 0.198 ... 0.221 ... 0.222
Rather than assuming that all members (principal and agents) of each firm are inter-
ested in maximizing the firm’s surplus or that only one type of actor (the principal)
essentially “runs the mill”, we now include vertical and horizontal interaction by
analyzing strategic delegation of price decisions.
3 Strategic delegation of price decisions
For the integrative analysis of intrafirm and interfirm interaction, we assume that
principals share revenues with their agents. Let si denote the revenue share for all the
agents of firm i as a whole. Agents are assumed to be identical and to distribute their
overall revenue share sipiqi proportionally to each agent’s individual contribution
ei,k/qi. Agents can observe and control the efforts of the team members. This means
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that each individual agent in firm i = 1, 2 chooses the same effort ei,k = ei for all
k = 1, ..., n and realizes the net utility
Ui(si, pi, pj) = sipiei − e
2
i /2
= sipi(1 − (1 + θ)pi + θpj)/n − (1 − (1 + θ)pi + θpj)
2/(2n2) ,
where pi is the price decision made by the agents of firm i = 1, 2, given the rival
firm’s price pj, i 6= j. The analysis of this delegated price competition complements
our former analysis of delegated quantity competition (Güth, Pull, Stadler 2011).
Both scenarios have in common that agents anticipate the effects of their sales choice
(price or quantity) and principals anticipate these decisions when implementing the
revenue sharing scheme. Thus, from a technical point of view, the price-delegation
game can be solved analogously to the quantity-delegation game. Indeed, in the
standard principal-agent scenario where n = 1 and θ = 0 the results for our price-
delegation game coincide with those of the quantity-delegation game (Güth, Pull,
Stadler 2011, p. 372).
3.1 The delegation game with a variable degree of market
heterogeneity
To study the influence of market heterogeneity on the compensation scheme, we
first restrict our analysis to the case of n = 2 agents in each firm and neglect fixed
compensation payments which would leave the strategic decisions as well as the
firms’ surplus unchanged. Maximization of agent utility
Ui(si, pi, pj) = sipi(1 − (1 + θ)pi + θpj)/2 − (1 − (1 + θ)pi + θpj)
2/8,
with respect to the price pi yields the equilibrium prices choices
pi(si, sj) =
(1 + 2θ)(1 + θ)2 + 2(1 + θ)(1 + 2θ)si + 2(1 + θ)(2 + 3θ)sj + 4(2 + 3θ)sisj
(1 + 2θ)(1 + θ)2 + 2(1 + θ)(2 + 4θ + θ2)(si + sj) + 4(4 + 8θ + 3θ2)sisj
(1)
for i = 1, 2, i 6= j, as functions depending on the compensation schemes, i.e. on




2(1 + 2θ)(1 + θ)2si + 4(2 + 5θ + 3θ
2)sisj
(1 + 2θ)(1 + θ)2 + 2(1 + θ)(2 + 4θ + θ2)(si + sj) + 4(4 + 8θ + 3θ2)sisj
,
the individual effort levels ei = qi/2, and the principals’ profits
πi(si, sj) = (1 − si)piqi = N/D , i = 1, 2, i 6= j,
where N = 2(1− si)[(1+2θ)(1+ θ)
2 +2(1+ θ)(1+2θ)si +2(1+ θ)(2+3θ)sj +4(2+
3θ)sisj][(1 + 2θ)(1 + θ)
2si + 2(2 + 5θ + 3θ
2)sisj] and D = [(1 + 2θ)(1 + θ)
2 + 2(1 +
θ)(2 + 4θ + θ2)(si + sj) + 4(4 + 8θ + 3θ
2)sisj]
2.
The first-order conditions for maximizing πi(si, sj) with respect to si, i = 1, 2, and
the obvious symmetry of the solution lead to a sixth-order polynomial equation
whose solution is s∗∗ = s∗∗(θ; n = 2) ∈ (0, 1).
The equilibrium revenue shares s∗∗ imply the identical prices
p∗∗ =
(1 + 2θ)(1 + θ)2 + 2(1 + θ)(3 + 5θ)s∗∗ + 4(2 + 3θ)s∗∗2




2(1 + θ)(1 + 3θ + 2θ2)s∗∗ + 4(2 + 5θ + 3θ2)s∗∗2




(1 + θ)(1 + 3θ + 2θ2)s∗∗ + 2(2 + 5θ + 3θ2)s∗∗2
(1 + 2θ)(1 + θ)2 + 4(1 + θ)(2 + 4θ + θ2)s∗∗ + 4(4 + 8θ + 3θ2)s∗2
.
Finally, principals’ profits are π∗∗ = (1 − s∗∗)p∗∗q∗∗.
Due to the nonlinearity of the reaction functions the game can in general be solved
only by using numerical techniques. An exception is the case of monopoly, i.e. the
market structure charaterized by two independent markets due to θ = 0. 2 In this
case agents’ price decisions (1) simplify to
pi(si) =
1 + 2si + 4sj + 8sisj




2Note, however, that unlike in section 2 it maintains intrafirm interaction and thus non-
monolithic firms.
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Hence, the principals’ profits are
π(si) =





The symmetric first-order conditions from maximizing the profits with respect to si
imply the cubic equation
8s3i + 6s
2
i + 2si − 1 = 0 ,
which has the unique real solution s∗∗(θ = 0; n = 2) = 1/4. Given this revenue-
sharing rule the agents charge the prices p∗∗ = 3/4 implying output levels q∗∗ = 1/4
and effort levels e∗∗ = 1/8 such that the principals realize the profits π∗∗ = 9/64,
agents the utility U∗∗ = 1/64, and the firm as a whole the surplus S∗∗ = 11/64 .
Numerical solutions (s∗∗, p∗∗, q∗∗, e∗∗, π∗∗, U∗∗, S∗∗) for varying degree of heterogene-
ity are presented in Table 3. As can be seen, a decreasing degree of heterogeneity
induces principals to offer higher revenue shares to their agents. Higher revenue
shares imply higher sales efforts by the agents corresponding to lower prices. In the
case of two separate markets (θ = 0) agents charge the highest prices. Starting from
that benchmark case declining prices result from declining heterogeneity (larger θ)
what raises the revenues to be shared between principals and agents. The revenue
effect dominates leading to (slightly) increasing profits as a result of a decreasing
market heterogeneity. Agents’ utility and, hence, the firms’ surplus also increase.
Table 3: Numerical solution of the price-delegation game, n = 2.
θ 0 1 ... θ → ∞
s∗∗ 0.250 0.298 ... 0.366
p∗∗ 0.750 0.685 ... 0.577
q∗∗ 0.250 0.315 ... 0.423
e∗∗ 0.125 0.157 ... 0.211
π∗∗ 0.141 0.151 ... 0.155
U∗∗ 0.016 0.020 ... 0.022
S∗∗ 0.172 0.190 ... 0.200
8
Compared to the benchmark solution (Table 1) of section 2, which neglects intrafirm
conflicts, delegation leads to higher prices and lower efforts of agents throughout.
The surplus in the delegation game is higher if markets are homogeneous but is
lower in case of very heterogeneous markets. This interesting result suggests that it
depends on the basic conditions of the market under consideration whether a firm
as a whole gains from delegation.
3.2 The delegation game with a variable number of agents
To study how the number of agents hired by both principals affects the market
outcome, we set the parameter θ equal to an intermediate degree of heterogeneity,
θ = 1, and vary the number n of agents symmetrically across firms.3 Maximization
of agent utility
Ui(si, pi, pj) = sipi(1 − 2pi + pj)/n − (1 − 2pi + pj)
2/(2n2)
with respect to the prices pi leads to the equilibrium price choices
pi(si, sj) =
12 + 6nsi + 10nsj + 5n
2sisj
12 + 14nsi + 14nsj + 15n2sisj
for i = 1, 2, i 6= j as functions of the strategic variables (si, sj), chosen by the two
principals. The resulting profits are
πi(s1, s2) = (1 − si)pi(1 − 2pi + pj) = N/D , i = 1, 2, i 6= j ,





















j) and D = (12+14nsi+14nsj+15n
2sisj)
2.
The first-order conditions for maximizing πi(si, sj) with respect to si, i = 1, 2,
and the obvious symmetry of the solution again imply a sixth-order polynomial
3Endogenizing the number of agents in both firms would require to study cases with different
numbers of agents in the two firms. For such a case, analytic results are very difficult to obtain.
We thus restrict ourselves to studying how a symmetric change in the number of agents employed
by each firm influences results via comparative statics.
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equation for each number n of a agents hired by both principals with the solution
s∗∗ = s∗∗(n; θ = 1) ∈ (0, 1). Equilibrium prices are
p∗∗ =
12 + 16ns∗∗ + 5n2s∗∗2










12 + 28ns∗∗ + 15n2s∗∗2
.
Table 4 illustrates how the solution (s∗∗, p∗∗, q∗∗, e∗∗, π∗∗, U∗∗, S∗∗) depends on the
number n of agents employed by each seller firm. As can be seen, an increasing
number of agents inquires principals to offer lower revenue shares to their agents.
Declining marginal effort costs of agents imply higher quantities and lower prices.
The principals’ profits first increase and later on decrease with more and more agents.
A similar inverted-U shaped relationship holds for the firms’ surplus whereas agents’
utility is monotonically decreasing.
Table 4: Numerical solution of the price-delegation game, θ = 1.
n 1 2 3 ... 100 ... n → ∞
s∗∗ 0.363 0.298 0.259 ... 0.040 ... 0.000
p∗∗ 0.765 0.685 0.641 ... 0.429 ... 0.333
q∗∗ 0.235 0.315 0.359 ... 0.571 ... 0.667
e∗∗ 0.235 0.157 0.120 ... 0.006 ... 0.000
π∗∗ 0.115 0.151 0.171 ... 0.235 ... 0.222
U∗∗ 0.038 0.020 0.013 ... 0.000 ... 0.000
S∗∗ 0.153 0.190 0.209 ... 0.235 ... 0.222
A comparison of the results to those of the benchmark case (Table 2) in section
2 shows that price delegation results in higher prices and lower effort levels. The
surplus in the delegation game is lower in case of a small number of agents but
higher in case of a large number of agents. Of course, in the limit case n → ∞
effort costs go to zero and the solutions coincide. Therefore it depends on intrafirm
organization (treated as exogenous in our analysis) whether the firm as a whole gains
from delegation or not.
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4 Conclusion
Price delegation to sales managers is usual. But managers do not suffer from the
effort of producing what they sell. In our analysis this effect is taken into account
by assuming that the agents who set the sales prices are the same who suffer from
exerting effort. Our price-delegation model assumes that both, principals and agents,
compete with each other. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which
agents react by choosing a sales price and by producing what is demanded. We
thus complement our former investigation of homogeneous markets with quantity
competition (Güth, Pull, Stadler 2011) by an analysis of more or less heterogeneous
markets with price competition. Both types of delegation can be observed in markets
for specific goods or services.
Our study demonstrates how implementing revenue sharing affects intra- and in-
terfirm interaction between principals (the owners) and agents (the workers) who
suffer the cost of producing more. Thus low effort cost in case of low output provides
an incentive for choosing high prices, an effect which is absent when sales manager
neglect producing efforts. Therefore, more intensive competition due to a decreas-
ing market heterogeneity or due to an increasing number of agents, hired by both
firms, leads to lower prices and higher revenues. Accordingly we derive an inverted
U-shaped relationship between the degree of market heterogeneity and the num-
ber of agents on the one hand and the firms’ surplus on the other. Whether price
delegation increases or decreases the surplus compared to the benchmark case of
monolithic firms depends decisively on the intrafirm organization and the interfirm
(market) structure.
The derived results pose quite a challenge for our intuition of how complex markets
operate. In our view, this alone justifies the attempt to complement our former
analysis of homogeneous markets with quantity competition by one of more or less
heterogeneous markets with price competition. Both studies together will hopefully
help to understand more thoroughly what has to be expected from an integrative
analysis of intrafirm delegation and interfirm sales competition.
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